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The debate between the realist and the anti-realist is-in a sense
the debate between the possibility of pure passive description versus the
necessity ofinterpretation. The realist argues, broadly, that there is a single
way the world truly is. Describing this world without the bias of interpre
tation has been the project of the philosophical realist. The realist hopes to
engage in what Nietzsche calls "that general renunciation of all interpreta
tion (of forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing,
falsifying, and whatever else is ofthe essence of interpreting)" (Genealogy
afMorals, 587). On the other hand, the anti-realist argues that a reduction
of the world into purely factual propositions is impossible; in other words,
the anti-realist believes that every proposition about the world involves
interpretation, so that a solely descriptive account of reality is impossible.
A potential consequence of the anti-realist position is that there is no single
'real' way the world is. By this view there is only the variety ofinterpretive
perspectives.
My project is to outline a reading ofNi etzsche that allows us to place
him within these two compcting account.;; ofreality. Nietzsche is commonly
ignored or misrepresented in contemporary Analytic Philosophy, even
though he is often credited (Taylor, 1987) with furnishing some of the most
devastating critiques of Analytic Metaphysics and Epistemology. So, my
goalis to furnish a miniature map that locates Nietzsche in relation to one
of the questions engaged by analytic philosophy. I will attempt a textual
analysis that argues-as many might suspect-that Nietzsche is properly an
anti-realist because of his view on language and valuation.
Nietzsche and, lately, Foucault are taken as enemies of Analytic
Epistemology because they argue that knowledge and the belief-making
process is guided by wntingentcultural conditions. Since the conditions are
contingent, there is no way to isolate solid criteria for justified-true-belief or
whatever. I agree that this is the reason for Nietzsche's distaste for
Epistemology, but, left unexamined, it potentially leads to what I take to be
misunderstanding (or understatement) of Nietzsche's anti-realist position.
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Alan White writes in Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, "The problem [for
Nietzsche] ... is not that there are no facts, but that there are too many facts.
There are too many in that not all can be registered, and not all can be
interrelated" (48). White argues that human beings are too limited to absorb
all possible propositions about the world. This limitation requires that some
propositions be taken seriously at the expense of others, and this taking
seriously of one proposition over another is an interpretive act, since one
must interpret which are the serious facts versus the frivolous facts.
Moreover, the interpretive act is fueled and guided by relations of power in
a culture.
My worry is that White's account-and accounts like it--of
Nietzsche's view of fact and interpretation leaves Nietzsche open to attack
from a savvy correspondence theorist (Cf). The traditional Cf argues that
a sufficiently powerful "viewer" of the world would be able to collect all
factual propositions and synthesize them into a single, truthful, perfectly
corresponding account of reality. Because Nietzsche's position has to be
reconstructed by stressing the limitation of humankind, the correspondence
theory is left a viable option. Just because human beings now are unable to
digest all the facts or see all the interrelations or transcend power relation
ships, the Cf argument would go, nothing is said against the possibility of
a God's eye viewpoint attainable, by, say, expert honest science as it
progresses into the future. Recall the position ascribed to Charles S. Peirce:
Peirce argued that there was a method-the method of science-that could
overcome the limitations inherent in the ways people "fix their beliefs."
Where, then, does Nietzsche stand in relation to the objectivity of science?
(Nietzsche gives us a rough hint when he writes, " ... physics, too, is only an
interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, ifI may say so!) and not
world explanation; [physics] ... strikes an age with fundamentally plebeian
tastes as fascinating, persuasive, and convincing--after all, it follows
instinctively the canon oftruth ofeternally popular sensualism" (BGE, 212) .)
If we are to take Nietzsche as a full-blown anti-realist, we must
understand how he evades the optimistic realist's challenge, fueled by a
position such as Peirce's. In other words, we must investigate whether
Nietzsche believes that a God's eye view is presently unattainable or that a
God'seyeviewisinprincipalincoherent. My view is the latter. I shall argue
that, although White's reading has shown an important sense (pemaps the
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most important sense) in which Nietzsche is an anti-realist, a deeper anti
realist tendency can be traced in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Genealogy of
Morals. I will also engage the traditional argument against relativism-as
some might think that I am painting Nietzsche as a relativist-and show how
Nietzsche evades the venerable Socratic charges against the relativist.
The cr argues that the Truth is correspondence between certain
linguistic propositions and the way the world really is. In this way, the cr
feels that a statement such as "there is a tree" is true if, in fact, a tree is in the
area indicated by "there." Nietzsche's Zarathustra is no friend ofthe cr: the
correspondence theorist's way of waiting for the truth of the world to come
to light is to remain "mere spectators ... Like those who stand in the street
and gape at the people who pass by" (237). Zarathustra charges that these
'scholars' are as blind to the (sun)light of truth as someone who never leaves
"dusty rooms."
Zarathustra gives a more obvious critique of the cr in the Conva
lescent. He awakens after confronting his most abysmal thought and
marvels at the chattering of his animals:
... Are not words and sounds rainbows and illusive bridges
between things which are eternally apart? ... For Me-how
should there be any outside-myself? There is no outside.
But all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is that we
forget. Have not names and sounds been given to things
that man might find things refreshing? Speaking is a
beautiful folly: with that man dances over all things (Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, 329).
The position Nietzsche is suggesting here argues that although words may
bridge the gap between the self (a single limited human perspecti ve) and the
world, there can never be a direct correspondence between propositions and
observations made by the self and factual features about the world: «how
should there be any outside-myselfl" Zarathustra wonders. We can recon
struct Nietzsche's argument this way: when anyone uses a word, he or she
is creating a link between a sound and the world that in no way 'contains'
the feature of the world picked out. How could a sound 'contain' anything
but noise? So, if the sound's link to the world is an arbitrary link, there is
no reason to suspect that the link specifies the essential, true, eternal nature
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of the world. At best the sound allows speakers to "dance over all things."
This dancing is not necessarily either careful or precise.
In Nietzsche's view, it is impossible in principle that dancing over
all things would allow someone to grasp all things unambiguously. Except
for the difficult cases ofonomatopoeia, the relationship between sounds and
the world is contingent. Moreover, the words themselves are not bridges of
steel and concrete. They are not bridges of permanence, but rather bridges
made of rainbows and illusions. There is flux in the relationship between
words and the world and flux in the meanings of words. " ... The form is
fluid," (the relationship between words and the world) "but the 'meaning'
[of words considered in isolation from the world] even more so" (Genealogy
a/Morals, 514). The argument against the cr has two branches. The first
denies the possibility for a word to link-up with reality in any objectively
convincing way, and the second denies that any word has a single transcen
dent meaning. In this way the possibility of a God's eye point of view is
negated: the complete set of propositions about the world that God would
have can, at best, be made of concepts that have no fixed meaning; even if
they did, they could not' contain' all of the features of what they are picking
out in the world. Again, the reason the containment is impossible is that
there is no way, when naming things in the world, to capture or contain the
essential features of the thing in the world. " ... How should there be any
outside myself. .. ," that is not accessed via" ... illusive bridges ...."
If it is the case that words are fluid over time, the cr might here
attempt to "fix the meaning" of a word-atleasttemporarily-so that a word
can pick out a distinct feature of the world. This would help the cr in her
or his project in that it would allow a word with a fixed meaning to 'link to'
a fixed reference in the world. Given a very powerful mechanism forlinking
all these fixed references in the world, the cr might think that a God's eye
perspective is yet possible.
Nietzsche's suggestion is that the gap between words and world is
a chasm that cannot be crossed by permanent, solid bridges. In response, the
cr attempts to make a word-bridge solid by stipulating the meaning of a
word. This is " ... a metaphysician's ambition to a hopeless position ... "
(BEG, ~7). Nietzsche evaluates the move to fix a reference as follows: "The
lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to
conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part
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of the rulers: they say 'this is this and this,' they seal every thing and event
with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it" (OM, 463), The problem,
in Nietzsche's view, is not that a cr cannot fix the reference of a word, but
rather that the reference that is fixed is arbitrary. This is another way toward
White '8 critique offacts, but it brings out more carefully the plight ofthe cr.
Where the cr attempts to fix the meaning of a word so that it picks out a
single thing in the world, what actually happens is that the cr picked out a
thing in the world and forced that as a meaning of a word. Ifthis is the case
if giving names is a lordly right and an act of taking possession-what is
taken is chosen arbitrarily by the cr. In practical terms, picking out
something in the world and calling it, for example, a tree ends up not fixing
any reference: what deteITIlines if the dirt in the five-meter circle around the
roots is contained in the word 'tree'; or who decides ifleaves and branches
are part of a tree--or if only the trunk (not counting the bark) is a tree?
The problem arises when the cr attempts to use this newly
stipulated word to link to reality and to make the claim that it picks out
exactly what is really there: ofcourse the word links to a reality, because
that reality is just what was put into the word. But filling up a word (fixing
a reference) with an arbitrarily chosen thing goes nowhere in showing that
lhatmeaning is the single possi ble meaning. At best, fi xing a meaning places
inside a word a reference that is relevant to some perspective. And, of
course, there is no reason to suspect that this perspective, powerful in its
abilily to temporarily fix the meanings of words, is able to access the Truth.
While the cr thinks that he or she has pursued reality outside the cave,
something else has happened in Nietzsche's view .
... purposes and utilities [of words for describing the
world] are only signs that a will to power has become
master ofsomething less powerful and imposed upon it the
character of a function; and the entire history of a "thing,"
and organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign
chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose
causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on
the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one
another in a purely chance fashion (OM, 513).
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Nietzsche elaborates on the position I am ascribing to him by
arguing that the meaning of any "thing" or "organ" (or word) is constantly
contingent-that the appropriation of language by the cr for a certain
purpose is no more legitimate than the appropriation by anyone else to fix
the reference in a different way (make the word 'tree', forinstance, describe
the juxtaposition ofleaves, branches, trunk, roots and a one-foot deep space
of air around the trunk). How the reference is fixed can "succeed ... in a
purely chance fashion." Nietzsche's view denies the possibility of some
way to describe the world that is essentially more right than any other.
Nietzsche argues that even an exact science of giving more complex and
complete meanings will fail to get closer to an objective meaning.
The "evolution" ofa thing, a custom, an organ is ...
by no means itsprogressus towards a goal ...-but a succes
sion of more or less profound, more or less mutually
independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances
they encounter, the attempts at transfonnation for the
purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of success
ful counteractions (OM, 514),
So, subduing a word by fixing its reference docs not further the
pursuitoftruth as correspondence. All it does is su bd ue words in an arbi trary
way. This is why White argues that "Even to register a fact then, is to
interpret, in that the registering invol ves the singling out ofthat specific fact"
(WNL, 48). But this is not solely, as White argues, because there is a
necessary exclusion of other facts. Nietzsche's critique of realism is more
serious: even if there was a mechanism-say, science-that could catalog
every fact, itis not clear, by Nietzsche's view, what should count as a 'fact'.
When any proposition is made about the world and held up as an example
of a' fact' , the words that comprise that proposition are either in flux or have
a fixed reference. Ifthey are in flux, then there is no way they can pick out
one truthful state of affairs in the world. !fthe meaning of the words is fixed
in the way the cr attempts to fix a reference, all that is fixed is one subjective
perspective of the world, and thus the proposition does not describe the
single truthful state of affairs.
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Traditionally, the cr has held up the curious coincidence between
the perception and philosophical descriptions made by many cultures.
Surely, argues the realist, if dividing up the world is a purely arbitrary
practice, there would be much more diversity in the ways the world is
divided up. But the absence of this diversity indicates to the realist that
world/word making is not arbitrary. Nietzsche challenges this inference:
The strange family resemblance of all Indian,
Greek, and Gennan philosophizing is explained easily
enough. Where there is affinity oflanguages, it cannot fail,
owing to the common philosophy of grammar-I mean,
owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by
similar grammatical functions-that everything is pre
pared at the outset for a similar development and sequence
of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred
against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation

(BOE, ~20).
Nietzsche recommends that one ought not to conclude from cultural coin
cidences of' facts' that everyone is latching on to some essential, true feature
ofLhe world. One ought to conclude from this coincidence only thatthe ways
ofdividing up world, as they rely on a 'philosophy of grammar', come from
very similnr philosophies of grammar and thus look very similar.
Nictzsche's view has serious consequence for science, the tradi
tional tool of the correspondence theorist. Of science, Nietzsche writes,
"StricUy speaking, there is no such thing as science 'without any presuppo
sitions' ... a philosophy, a 'faith,' must always be there first of all, so that
science can acquire from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right
to cxist" (OM, 587-88), From the correspondence theorist's standpoint this
view of science would be startling. Science is supposed to be the tool by
which all references can be fixed and the truth of the world can be told. But
in light of Nietzsche'S critique or the CTposition. his view on science is not
surprising at all. Science is engaged in the pursuit of a certain kind of thing
that it believes-because of the will of some lord of names-to be facts.
Even if science could collect all ofthese 'facts', what counted as a fact would
itself be arbitrary. Ofcourse, the plight of the scientist is deepened to a third
degree when we attempt to make sense of the significance of those things
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that are called facts. This is White's critique, what I am calling the third
critique, of the pursuit of truth: " ... as soon as this truth or fact--or any
other-is selectively registered, the problem of interpretation arises once
again: what is the significance ofthe fact?" (49). The situation for the realist
in Nietzsche'S view is precarious. Truth as correspondence loses its
coherence as Nietzsche points out that the bridge between projX)sitions
about the world and the world itself are always illusory and tenuous.
A brief recap of Nietzsche's critique ofcorrespondence theory: A)
Our only means of describing the world, our only access to the world are
subjective states and the words used to describe subjective states. Word
bridges are illusory. B) No description can have a non-arbitrary fixed
reference. C) Even if the problems of A and B could be solved, the facts
acquired about the world would need to be placed into some system of
significance which, by definition, would be subjective (Le. significance to
whom?).
If this is Nietzsche's view, one might be tempted to label him a
relativist. But if Nietzsche is a relativist, he could fall prey to the venerable
critique against relativism that Socrates used againstProtagoras. Forthe rest
ofthis paper! will give the framework forperspectivism that Nietzsche more
rightly fits into. In the process I will show how perspcctivism evades the
critique of Protagorean relativism.
Relativism is the position that every proposition about the world is
as correct as any other proposition. According to the relativist, 'truth'
depends on your point ofview. When Protagoras articulated a view like this
Socrates charged him with an incoherence that is now famous: "How could
you, Protagoras, argue that relativism is true ifrelativism argues that nothing
is true?"
Relativism seems to be sclf-refuting because if relativism was right,
there would be no reason to believe that relativism was right-truth depends
on your point of view. Whether or not this critique of Protagoras is
devastating is not clear (I think it is not), but the dangeris that Nietzsche may
be charged with the same incoherence. Is Nietzsche's perspcctivism just a
perspective, no more right than any other-say, the correspondence
theorist's-perspective?
Although strict relativism is consistent with Nietzsche's point of
view, it leaves no room for objectivity through diversity. This feature of
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objectivity through diversity of perspectives is the way Nietzsche answers
Protagorean incoherence. The relativist seems to throw his or her hands up
in the air and proclaim that 'everything is right.' Nietzsche needs to do no
such thing, as his view allows for valuations to arise from engaging many
perspectives. In an often cited passage from Genealogy, Nietzsche writes,
... let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual
fiction that posited a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless
knowing subject'; let us guard against the snares of such
contradictory concepts as 'pure reason,' 'absolute spiritu
ality,' 'knowledge in itself'; these always demand that we
should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an
eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and
interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes
seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always
demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is
only a perspective seeing. only a perspective 'knowing';
and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the
more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing,
the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our
'objectivity,' be (GM, 555).
The first halfof the quote is the critique of realism that developed in the first
halfofthe paper. Alone. it makes Nietzsche sound relativist and thus subject
to Socrates' s challenge. The second half ofthe quote illuminates Nietzsche's
view by explaining the role of a variety of perspectives. Not every
perspective is as right as any other, and the only way to make value
judgements between perspectives is to be aware of the diversity of per spec
tives. Our concepts of a thing is made rich by noting as many ofthe possible
perspectives one can. Only in light of this richness is valuation (viz.
objectivity) in knowledge possible:
'objectivity' ... understood not as 'contemplation without
interest' (which is nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability
to contro[one'sPro and Con and to dispose ofthem. so that
one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and
affective interpretations in the service of knowledge
(GM,555).
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So, even though Nietzsche is no realist, he is not a relativist either. This is
a way in Nietzsche's view to evade the charge of 'everything is correct.'
Valuation is possible, given a diversity of perspectives on the world-that
is, given a diversity in what is considered important and what is considered
a 'fact.' The framework for perspectivism is one where many views on the
world are weighed in light of the kind oflife a person wishes to lead and the
kind ofworld a person wishes to live in. This perspectivism has a strong anti
realist tendency, but does not leave the anti-realist helpless.
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